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Abstract: I answer Alvin Plantinga’s challenge to provide a ‘proper’ de jure 
objection to religious belief. What I call the ‘sophisticates’ evidential objection’ 
(SEO) concludes that sophisticated Christians lack epistemic justiﬁcation for 
believing central Christian propositions. The SEO utilizes a theory of epistemic 
justiﬁcation in the spirit of the evidentialism of Richard Feldman and Earl Conee. 
I defend philosophical interest in the SEO (and its underlying evidentialism) against 
objections from Reformed epistemology, by addressing Plantinga’s criteria for a 
proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of 
‘ impulsional evidence’. I argue that no result from Plantinga-style Reformed 
epistemology precludes the reasons I oﬀer in favour of giving the SEO its due 
philosophical attention. 
Introduction 
There is a kind of objection concerning the epistemic rationality of 
religious belief that has not been adequately rebutted, much less refuted. The 
objection focuses on the evidence sophisticated religious believers possess with 
respect to propositions that are central to a religious belief system. Here I restrict 
my discussion primarily to Christian beliefs. Most Christians believe propositions 
expressed by the following: ‘God – the all-powerful, all-knowing, wholly good 
creator of the universe – exists’, ‘ Jesus of Nazareth was God incarnate’, ‘ Jesus 
was resurrected after his death’, ‘ I will live again after I die’. Call such prop­
ositions Christian propositions. The objection, which I call the sophisticates’ 
evidential objection (or, SEO), concludes that the total evidence possessed by 
sophisticated Christians is not suﬃcient epistemically to justify their beliefs with 
respect to Christian propositions. 
Reformed epistemologists, such as Alvin Plantinga, have convinced many 
philosophers that the kind of objection I mention fails to be ‘proper’ (i.e. worthy 
of philosophical interest) precisely because it concerns evidence. I argue that: 
(1) Plantinga has not shown this, and (2) the SEO satisﬁes Plantinga’s own criteria 
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for a proper de jure objection. My arguments address Plantinga’s criteria for a 
proper de jure objection, his anti-evidentialist arguments, and the relevance of 
‘ impulsional evidence’. I conclude with a response to the ‘so-what? objection’, 
according to which, even if all I have said is correct there is still no reason for 
sophisticated Christians to be troubled. My overarching conclusion is not that the 
SEO proves its conclusion, but rather that nothing from Plantinga-style Reformed 
epistemology gives us good reason not to take it seriously: it is a proper de jure 
objection. 
Presuppositions of the SEO 
The presuppositions of the kind of objection I have in mind are partly 
motivated by the following idea: many contemporary epistemologists, including 
Plantinga, analyse epistemic concepts in support of the common-sense, non-
sceptical view that we have a lot of knowledge on the basis of sense perception, 
introspection, rational insight, reasoning, memory, and testimony. Accordingly, 
there is much agreement concerning examples of epistemically justiﬁed (and 
unjustiﬁed) belief. For instance, it is agreed that typical sensory beliefs concern­
ing medium-size objects at close range are justiﬁed; so, if a theory implies that 
such beliefs are typically not justiﬁed, then that result is taken as a reason to deny 
the theory. Likewise, if a theory implies that human beliefs formed on the basis of 
tea leaf reading (or clairvoyance, or reading the stars) are routinely justiﬁed, or 
that the typical sensory beliefs of six-year-olds are unjustiﬁed, then such results 
are taken to be reasons to deny the theory. My project ﬁts within this tradition 
(call it the non-sceptical tradition). 
My guiding principle is that any SEO worth taking seriously will rely on a theory 
of epistemic justiﬁcation that, from the perspective of the non-sceptical tradition, 
plausibly gets the correct results in all the uncontroversial cases concerning 
epistemically justiﬁed (and unjustiﬁed) doxastic attitudes; furthermore, that a 
theory of justiﬁcation plausibly gets all the uncontroversial examples right is a 
fact that provides substantial motivation for the theory. Finally, I assume that the 
following principle is entirely reasonable: for any substantially motivated theory 
T, unless there is an argument, utilizing non-partisan reasons, showing that T is 
explanatorily worse than another substantially motivated theory, T is properly 
motivated and thus worthy of philosophical interest. In what follows, (i) I defend 
a substantially motivated theory of epistemic justiﬁcation against objections from 
Reformed epistemology, and (ii) I argue that the theory, together with additional 
facts about sophisticated religious believers, provides reason to think that the 
SEO itself is worthy of philosophical interest. 
The theory I have in mind is in the spirit of the well-known evidentialist view of 
epistemic justiﬁcation (hereafter, ‘ justiﬁcation’) developed by Richard Feldman 
and Earl Conee. Some notable presuppositions of the theory are as follows: ﬁrst, 
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the justiﬁcation at issue is propositional justiﬁcation rather than doxastic justiﬁ­
cation.1 Second, the justiﬁcation at issue is synchronic, having to do with what 
one’s total evidence at a particular time indicates. Third, the SEO assumes that 
justiﬁcation comes in degrees; thus, it is consistent with the popular view that a 
high degree of justiﬁcation is – when added to true belief and the satisfaction of a 
Gettier condition – suﬃcient for knowledge. 
Fourth, although there are various standards of epistemic justiﬁcation we 
might consider, the SEO concerns only a modest standard: an on-balance, pre­
ponderance-of-evidence standard. Accordingly, the belief attitude toward a prop­
osition is justiﬁed for one at time t only if one’s total evidence at t, on balance, 
indicates the truth of the proposition. Likewise, the disbelief attitude is justiﬁed 
only if one’s total evidence indicates the falsity of the proposition; and the 
suspension-of-judgement attitude is justiﬁed only if one’s total evidence indicates 
the truth of the proposition to roughly the same extent that it indicates the falsity 
of the proposition. Hence, to believe p when one’s total evidence indicates the 
falsity of p, or when one’s total evidence indicates the falsity of p to roughly 
the same extent that it indicates the truth of p, is to believe against one’s evidence 
(or, what doesn’t ﬁt with one’s evidence). 
Fifth, the SEO assumes a version of modest foundationalism about justiﬁcation, 
where the justiﬁcation at issue depends essentially on something mental that can 
plausibly be understood as a reason to believe. Because it is anti-sceptical and 
assumes modest foundationalism about justiﬁcation, the SEO is consistent with 
the view that psychologically basic (i.e. non-inferred) beliefs – with respect to 
external world propositions (e.g. ‘ that is a tree’), memory propositions (e.g. ‘ I had 
coﬀee for breakfast ’), and rational insight propositions (e.g. ‘every golden trum­
pet is a trumpet’) that are believed immediately as a response to experience – can 
be, and often are, justiﬁed. 
Sixth, ‘sophisticated Christians’ is taken to mean those Christians who are 
(i) smart, reﬂective, and well-educated; (ii) aware of the problem of evil, facts 
about religious diversity, and various arguments that count against the truth of 
Christian propositions; and (iii) aware of many very smart people who either 
suspend judgement on or disbelieve Christian propositions.2 
The SEO assumes what I call the ‘ evidence-justiﬁcation principle’ : 
evidence-justiﬁcation principle If a person S is epistemically justiﬁed 
in believing a proposition p at time t, then S’s total evidence supports 
p at t and fails to support yp at t. 3 
The evidence-justiﬁcation principle is entailed by what I take to specify the central 
idea of synchronic epistemic evidentialism (call it ‘general evidentialism’ or ‘ GE’) : 
general evidentialism (GE) S is epistemically justiﬁed in believing a 
proposition p at time t iﬀ p is supported by S’s total evidence at t. 4 
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The SEO, then, is consistent with, and motivated by, the traditional view that 
having evidence is of great epistemic importance.5 
By the ‘evidence’ required for justiﬁcation, I am thinking of the ‘mentalism’ 
(or, ‘mind internalism’) endorsed by Conee and Feldman (2004), according to 
which all the factors that contribute to justiﬁcation are in a person’s mind.6 
Evidence consists only of mental states, events, and conditions that are indi­
cations of truth. The SEO assumes what can usefully be termed long evidence, 
which construes the evidence one possesses broadly and deeply: all experiences 
that plausibly indicate truths count as evidence.7 Accordingly, one’s evidence at a 
time includes one’s perceptual experiences, introspective experiences, memorial 
experiences, ‘seeing-the-truth’ experiences, reasoning experiences, and any 
other kinds of mental experiences that plausibly indicate truths, as well as stored 
experiences that fall under any of the categories listed above.8 One’s ‘ total evi­
dence’ consists of all one’s occurrent and stored long evidence. 
These suppositions taken together (with a few others to be discussed) consti­
tute the view I will refer to as long evidentialism. It is intended not to be novel, 
but to reﬂect (from the perspective of the non-sceptical tradition) our un­
controversial judgements about examples of justiﬁed (and unjustiﬁed) belief. It is 
thus substantially motivated and at least prima facie plausible as properly motiv­
ated. Later, I provide positive reasons to think that the SEO is worthy of interest ; 
but, ﬁrst, I do some ground clearing pertaining to work from Reformed epis­
temology, for some of it calls into question my claim that long evidentialism is 
properly motivated. 
Responses from Plantinga-style reformed epistemology 
The work of Reformed epistemologists such as Plantinga suggests that 
any objection along the line of the SEO is misguided or irrelevant. Plantinga has 
argued that one’s having evidence with respect to a proposition p is not necessary 
for one’s being epistemically justiﬁed in believing p, and that one’s having evi­
dence with respect to p is irrelevant or unnecessary for one’s belief that p to be 
epistemically rational. Plantinga has typically drawn such conclusions on the 
basis of objections to what he calls ‘evidentialism’, and he has provided many 
negative critical assessments of the views of a wide variety of well-known epis­
temologists who think of themselves as evidentialists. This pattern gets an update 
in his mature Warranted Christian Belief [hereafter, WCB or (2000)] where 
Plantinga argues that the only proper objection to the rationality of religious 
belief is the ‘Freud & Marx objection’ (which does not call into question the 
evidence religious believers have). Given these data, and the fact that Plantinga 
is the central ﬁgure in Reformed epistemology, it seems that the basic thrust 
of Reformed epistemology’s response to the SEO would be this : the ob­
jection assumes a central tenet of evidentialism (i.e. the evidence-justiﬁcation 
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principle) ; but, one’s having evidence is either (a) unnecessary for one to be 
epistemically justiﬁed in believing p, or (b) inessential to whether one’s doxastic 
attitude toward p is rational ; hence, the objection fails to reveal any problem for 
sophisticated Christians. 
There are subtle taxonomic details to sort through. A clever Reformed epis­
temologist might exploit such subtleties to deny both (a) and (b) above; for in­
stance, one might use Plantinga’s notion of ‘ impulsional evidence’ – together 
with insights from Norman Kretzmann’s compelling argument that Plantinga’s 
anti-evidentialist arguments apply only to narrow, implausible construals of 
evidentialism – in order to argue that Plantinga is an evidentialist !9 But, as I argue 
in the section on ‘Plantingan evidentialism’, a Plantinga-motivated evidentialism 
is far too epistemically anaemic to block the force of the SEO or show that it is 
improper. 
Plantinga’s project in Warranted Christian Belief 
Plantinga’s goal in WCB is to show how it is possible for Christian belief to 
be epistemically rational. He argues that the ‘extended a/c model’ reveals that it 
is epistemically possible for Christian beliefs to satisfy the conditions of his own 
theory of epistemic warrant. 10 He seeks to motivate our interest in his theory by 
arguing that the only proper de jure objection calls into question the Plantingan 
warrant of Christian belief. In its broadest form, the de jure objection goes like 
this : whether Christian beliefs are true or false, such beliefs are ‘ irrational or 
unreasonable or unjustiﬁed or in some other way properly subject to invidious 
epistemic criticism’ (Plantinga (2000), 167). Plantinga whittles away various par­
ticular de jure objections, settling ﬁnally on what he takes to be the only proper 
one (i.e. the Freud & Marx objection).11 He then argues that any version of that 
objection assumes the falsity of Christian beliefs. If he is successful, then since 
what he calls a ‘de facto objection’ assumes that Christian belief is false, Plantinga 
will have shown that there is no proper de jure challenge that is independent of a 
de facto challenge.12 The relevant result is that there is no cogent de jure objection 
at all. This implies that the SEO is also no good. 
Plantinga on de jure objections 
Well before the publication of WCB, William Alston (1995), 68–69, revealed 
the implausibility of thinking that there is only one proper de jure objection. 
Undaunted by the criticism, Plantinga devised in WCB a slightly new strategy for 
convincing us: ﬁrst, count as ‘ improper’ any de jure objection that has some of 
the following properties: lacking viability (Plantinga (2000), 169), lacking sensi­
bility (ibid.), being trivial (ibid., 137), and not being relevant (ibid.) ;13 second, trot 
out several de jure objections and argue that they are easily refuted or possess 
some of the improper-making properties; third, leave showing the improperness 
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of any other de jure objections as homework for the rest of us (ibid., 104); and 
fourth, conclude that the Freud & Marx objection is the only proper de jure ob­
jection. 
Although WCB has many excellent qualities, the strategy Plantinga uses to 
motivate our interest in his epistemic theory is not among them. The fourth step 
is especially puzzling in light of his claim that the Freud & Marx objection is futile : 
‘We can … see the futility of the [Freud & Marx] complaint’, he says, ‘once we see 
how theistic belief might have warrant’ (Plantinga (2000), 168). But, an objec­
tion’s being futile surely sounds as bad as the other improper-making properties. 
So why favour the Freud & Marx objection? 
Although I ﬁnd no good reason to privilege the Freud & Marx objection, 
Plantinga has a practical reason to do so, since that objection happens to be the 
very one for which his own theory of warrant is relevant. But, from the fact that 
someone has a practical reason to privilege an objection, it does not follow that 
we have an epistemic reason to do so. Even if taking a lot of eﬀort to rebut is 
required for something to be a proper de jure objection, the SEO suﬃces.14 Lest 
we draw this conclusion hastily, let us consider Plantinga’s arguments for the 
conclusion that there is no proper evidentialist objection to the epistemic justi­
ﬁcation of Christian belief. 
Plantinga on evidentialism and epistemic justiﬁcation 
In WCB (as elsewhere) Plantinga’s commentary on epistemic justiﬁcation 
focuses on what he calls the ‘classical picture’, which is comprised of three 
elements: a deontological view of epistemic justiﬁcation, evidentialism, and 
classical foundationalism. 15 Plantinga construes ‘evidentialism’ such that some­
thing counts as a person S’s evidence E with respect to a proposition p only if E is 
propositional and is relied on explicitly by S in an inference. And he claims that 
evidentialism just is a deontological theory (having to do with praiseworthiness 
and blameworthiness) that gets its rationale from classical foundationalism. 
Although there are examples of such views, the long evidentialism implicit 
in the SEO is not among them. As I have said, long evidentialism is a modest 
foundationalist view. Since it is an evidentialist view, it entails that there is evi­
dence in all cases of justiﬁed basic belief ; hence, given our anti-sceptical as­
sumption, long evidentialism implies that there are justiﬁed basic beliefs which 
do not get their justiﬁcation via psychological inference from other believed 
propositions. Furthermore, long evidentialism does not get its rationale from 
deontological considerations having to do with praise and blame; indeed, I am 
convinced that there is no good argument from that kind of deontology to epis­
temic internalism (of which long evidentialism is a species).16 From what, then, 
does long evidentialism get its rationale? It gets it (in part) from the fact that it 
does better than any other theory at preserving all the uncontroversial judge­
ments that are part of the non-sceptical tradition. Although I will not argue for 
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that conclusion here, I will defend long evidentialism against Plantinga’s anti­
evidentialist arguments. 
Since long evidentialism is not a theory that falls under the ‘classical picture’, 
the SEO is immune to all of Plantinga’s arguments that trade on a deontological 
notion of epistemic justiﬁcation, or classical foundationalism, or Plantinga’s 
construal of ‘evidentialism’. Indeed, only one passage in WCB so much as sug­
gests an objection applicable to long evidentialism: 
Consider memory. You remember what you had for lunch: lentil soup and a 
doughnut. This belief isn’t based on propositional evidence. You don’t infer it from 
other things you know or believe, such things, perhaps, as your knowledge that you 
always have a doughnut and lentil soup for lunch, or your knowledge that it is now 
shortly after lunchtime and there are doughnut crumbs on your desk and an empty 
plastic soup dish in your trash. … But it also isn’t based on an experience. At any rate, 
it is clear that memory beliefs are not based on anything like sensuous experience or 
phenomenal imagery. There may be a bit of such imagery present (a fragmentary and 
partial image of a doughnut or a bowl, perhaps), but you certainly don’t form the belief 
on the basis of that image. It is clear that you could remember without having that 
imagery – or, indeed, any other imagery. So the imagery isn’t necessary. It is also 
insuﬃcient; you could also have that imagery without remembering. The reason is 
that the imagery that goes with imagining that you had a doughnut and lentil soup for 
lunch, or entertaining the proposition that you did, is indistinguishable (at least in my 
own case) from the imagery that goes with remembering that you had a doughnut and 
lentil soup for lunch. And even if you do have fairly explicit phenomenal imagery in 
connection with this memory, you surely don’t know that it was lentil soup on the 
basis of that imagery; the image isn’t nearly clear, detailed, and explicit enough to 
enable you to distinguish it from, for example, imagery of pea soup, or bean soup, or 
many other kinds of soup. (Plantinga (2000), 105–106) 
To his familiar (and, I think, correct) point that we do not typically form a 
memory belief via a conscious inference from propositions about how things 
seem to us, Plantinga here adds a stronger claim: ‘But it also isn’t based on an 
experience’ (ibid.). This gives us the seed of an objection even to the 
general version of evidentialism: if there are epistemically rational beliefs that are 
not related in any epistemic way to an experience, then there is no principled 
reason for maintaining that all epistemically justiﬁed beliefs are supported by 
evidence. 
However, Plantinga does not really think that there are any epistemically 
rational beliefs disconnected from experience. Notice the qualiﬁcation: ‘At any 
rate, it is clear that memory beliefs are not based on anything like sensuous ex­
perience or phenomenal imagery’ (ibid., 106). Let us take care: it is one thing to 
say that a memory belief is not based on an experience, but it is another thing to 
say that a memory belief is not based on sensuous experience or phenomenal 
imagery. It may be that epistemically rational memory and a priori beliefs need 
not be based on sensuous experience or phenomenal imagery, but Plantinga does 
not show, nor does he believe, that experience plays no role in determining the 
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epistemic status of memory and a priori beliefs. To clarify, consider one more 
passage where Plantinga compares religious beliefs to memory beliefs and a 
priori beliefs: 
In a certain sense, there isn’t anything to go on in any of the three cases. You don’t 
accept memory and obvious a priori beliefs on the basis of other beliefs; but you also 
lack the detailed phenomenological basis, the rich and highly articulated sensuous 
imagery that is involved in perception. What you do have in all three cases is another 
kind of phenomenal evidence, what I have been calling doxastic evidence. (In WPF I 
called it impulsional evidence.) There is a certain kind of phenomenology that 
distinguishes entertaining a proposition you believe from one you do not: the former 
simply seems right, correct, natural, approved–the experience isn’t easy to describe 
(WPF, 190ﬀ.) You have this doxastic evidence in all three sorts of cases (as, indeed, in 
any case of belief), and you have nothing else to go on. But you don’t need anything else 
to go on: it is not as if things would be better, from an epistemic point of view, if you 
believed, say, 2+1=3 or that you had oatmeal for breakfast this morning on the 
evidential basis of other propositions, or on the basis of some kind of sensuous 
imagery more or less like that involved in perception. (Plantinga (2000), 264) 
Based on this passage, a case against GE and long evidentialism might go as 
follows: with respect to perceptual beliefs such as visual beliefs, there is the 
presence of experiential evidence in the form of phenomenal qualities: things 
looking a certain way to you can legitimately be construed as supporting evidence 
for your visual beliefs ; however, in the case of memory and a priori beliefs, there 
need be no such thing as the way things look to you (e.g. no images) that play a 
role in your forming the beliefs that you do; hence, you have no evidence for 
memory beliefs and a priori beliefs. 
However, if this were taken to be an objection to GE or long evidentialism, then 
it would fail. From the fact that no highly articulated sensuous imagery is present 
with respect to an intuitively justiﬁed believed proposition, it does not follow that 
there is no evidence. Consider an elementary a priori belief formed as a response 
to an experience that is sometimes described as ‘seeing the truth’. It is very 
plausible that such an experience is characterized by awareness of the truth-
making constituents of the relevant proposition and relations among those con­
stituents.17 So, it is very plausible that having the peculiar experience constituting 
‘seeing the truth’ just is good evidence for the proposition believed. 
Something similar goes for occurrent memory beliefs, which are formed as a 
response to memorial experience: whether or not the experience includes sen­
sory imagery, it surely has a looking-back-in-time quality to it, for, if it lacked 
such a quality, it would not give rise to what qualiﬁes as an occurrent memory 
belief.18 Furthermore, the experience represents some particular state of aﬀairs 
rather than others. The looking-back-in-time quality and the representative 
content involved are plausibly evidence for something’s having occurred in the 
past; for, that kind of experience just is the kind that indicates something’s having 
happened in the past. Such justiﬁcation is defeasible, but unless it is defeated by 
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other evidence one possesses, it is plausible that the peculiar experience that goes 
with remembering just is a good reason (i.e. good evidence) for the relevant 
proposition believed. 
I conclude that reﬂection on the passage reveals nothing to impugn long evi­
dentialism. In every instance of an epistemically rational belief that Plantinga 
discusses, there is some experience that serves as the ground or basis or trigger for 
that belief. Moreover, in every uncontroversial case of epistemically rational be­
lief, there is an experience (or set of experiences) that can plausibly be regarded as 
indicating the truth of the proposition believed. So, nothing along the lines under 
discussion provides reason to deny long evidentialism. These considerations 
may help to explain Norman Kretzmann’s claim that, were it not for Plantinga’s 
‘artiﬁcially narrow notion of evidence when characterizing evidentialism or his 
own position … he would not be an anti-evidentialist ’ (Kretzmann (1992), 24). 
Plantingan evidentialism 
Might we argue against the SEO by adapting some of Plantinga’s epistemic 
views into an evidentialist framework amenable to long evidentialism? In par­
ticular, can we get a Plantingan understanding of the evidence that long evi­
dentialism appeals to in order to argue that sophisticates’ Christian beliefs are 
typically justiﬁed? Two ideas come to mind: Plantinga’s proper functionalism 
and what he calls ‘ impulsional evidence’. 
Evidentialism and proper function 
Although we cannot easily understand the supports relation mentioned in 
GE in terms of proper function (since GE pertains to propositional justiﬁcation), 
perhaps we can understand, in terms of proper function, a long-evidentialist­
friendly relation involved in doxastic justiﬁcation. In one place Feldman & Conee 
(2004, 83) characterize evidentialism as follows: ‘Doxastic attitude D toward 
proposition p is epistemically justiﬁed for S at t if and only if having D toward p 
ﬁts the evidence S has at t ’. Perhaps the epistemic ﬁttingness appealed to can be 
explained in terms of proper function. As I have said, Plantinga thinks that, in 
every case of epistemically rational belief, there is an experience that serves as 
a ground or basis or trigger for that belief. The epistemic ﬁttingness under 
discussion works nicely when we consider the experience to involve a 
non-inferential mental state that very plausibly indicates the truth of a proposition 
due to the fact that it pretty closely reﬂects or mirrors the relevant proposition: 
intuitively, a hand-like visual experience indicates that ‘ that is a hand’; a voice-like 
auditory experience indicates that ‘someone is talking’ ; a looking-back-in-time 
experience of a certain sort indicates that ‘ I had coﬀee for breakfast ’ ; a certain 
seeing-the-truth experience indicates that ‘2+3=5’, etc.19 There is some 
plausibility in thinking that we are exhibiting epistemic proper function in 
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these cases when we form the relevant beliefs on the basis of the evidence 
described. 
The trouble is that Plantinga claims that some experiences serve as the causal 
triggers for rational beliefs when those experiences do not closely reﬂect or mirror 
the relevant proposition. For instance, Plantinga says that one’s experience of 
looking at a lovely ﬂower can trigger the sensus divinitatis to produce a belief such 
as ‘God made all this’. The experience is of a ﬂower, not of God; but, the belief is 
about God. Plantinga has done an admirable job of explaining how it is possible 
for that belief to be the result of proper function, but it does not follow that the 
belief ﬁts the evidence at issue (by hypothesis, the ﬂower-experience doesn’t look 
like God).20 What seems entirely natural is that beliefs with respect to proposi­
tions such as ‘ that is a ﬂower’ ﬁt the evidence, because it is plausible that the 
evidence is an indication of the truth of such propositions. But, it seems ad hoc to 
think that such evidence indicates the truth of the theistic proposition. 
I am open to the possibility that the doxastic epistemic ﬁttingness relation can 
be understood in terms of proper function, but it seems to me that any plausible 
view along that line will deny that an experience’s mere triggering of a belief, 
even when the proposition believed is true, and even when it is caused by a 
reliable belief-producing mechanism, counts as an indication to the person that 
the proposition believed is true. But, what counts as an indication of truth to 
the person just is what the evidential supports relation pertains to, and this is a 
nonnegotiable component of long evidentialism. This is no objectionably dog­
matic point, since it is Plantinga’s judgement of the example that is controversial. 
So, unless there is some good reason to think that the mental experience as of, 
say, seeing a ﬂower is itself an indication of the truth of a theistic proposition, 
there seems to be little hope of adapting Plantinga’s particular views about proper 
function to long evidentialism in a way that shows that the SEO fails.21 
Evidentialism and ‘ impulsional evidence ’ 
As the quotation above indicates, Plantinga says that there is ‘ impulsional 
evidence’ in all cases of belief. Perhaps reﬂection on this fact shows that the SEO 
is not worthy of attention. Saying that the impulsional evidence for a sensory, 
memorial, or a priori proposition makes the proposition seem right, Plantinga 
claims that such evidence is good enough for belief, from the epistemic point of 
view; indeed, he says you don’t need anything else to go on. One might think, 
then, that this result lends support to long evidentialism;22 moreover, because 
there is impulsional evidence in all cases of belief, and sophisticated Christians 
have lots of Christian beliefs, one might claim that Christian propositions are 
supported by such evidence. 
Nevertheless, there are reasons to doubt that ‘ impulsional evidence’ actually 
does any interesting evidential work. One reason concerns the nature of impul­
sional evidence. In Warrant and Proper Function (1993a) – where Plantinga 
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discusses in detail the relation between seeing the truth of a proposition (e.g. ‘ if 
Sam is happy, then someone is happy’) and impulsional evidence – he writes: 
You see that the proposition is true: and that involves an inclination or impulse toward 
believing the proposition–an inclination that is either experienced or such that it can 
be brought to consciousness by paying attention to it. Perhaps we should say instead 
that the proposition in question has a sort of attractiveness, or perhaps inevitableness 
about it, or perhaps a sort of perceived ﬁttingness; the phenomenology is hard to 
describe, but familiar to us all. (Plantinga (1993a), 191) 
Although the impulsion to believe may be stronger with respect to obvious a 
priori beliefs than with other kinds of belief, the general idea is supposed to apply 
in all cases of belief : (1) one’s impulsion to believe (i.e. the experience of the 
impulse alone) causes the proposition to seem true to one; thus, (2) ‘ impulsional 
evidence’ is evidence for the proposition believed. 
But, the inference from (1) to (2) is doubtful. Note ﬁrst that feeling impelled to 
believe a proposition is not always epistemic. A proposition such as ‘everything 
will turn out all right’ may be so attractive to a person in a desperate situ­
ation – because it is reassuring – that the person feels impelled to believe it. But 
its being reassuring does not itself provide any epistemic reason to believe the 
proposition. An epistemic reason to believe a proposition just is an indication 
that the proposition is true. The desperate-situation example shows that one may 
feel impelled to believe a proposition even if one has no epistemic reason to 
believe it. So, if one does have an epistemic reason to believe a proposition, that 
reason is something other than the impulsion to believe. The upshot is that an 
impulsion to believe is not itself evidence. 
Second, reﬂection suggests that Plantinga has backward the explanatory re­
lation between seeing the truth and feeling impelled to believe. One doesn’t see 
the truth of a proposition because (in part) one feels impelled to believe it, but 
rather one feels impelled to believe the proposition because one sees its truth. 
Seeing that a proposition is true surely counts as an epistemic reason for believ­
ing the proposition, since the experience of seeing the truth of a proposition 
indicates to one that it is true, but feeling impelled to believe is, by itself, no 
epistemic reason at all for believing the proposition.23 Similarly, one’s having 
a visual experience as of a tree might cause one to feel impelled to believe 
that ‘ that is a tree’, but for the same reasons as mentioned above, it does not 
follow, nor is it plausible, that the feeling of impulsion itself indicates that ‘ that is 
a tree’. 
In any case, the fact that there is ‘ impulsional evidence’ in all instances of 
belief – no matter how irrational – reveals that having impulsional evidence is far 
too anaemic to do much epistemological work. Furthermore, reﬂection on the 
ubiquitous nature of ‘ impulsional evidence ’ reveals that any evidentialist view 
taking ‘ impulsional evidence’ to be suﬃcient for justiﬁcation runs foul of the 
non-sceptical tradition, which has its plausibility in part because it acknowledges 
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that not all beliefs are justiﬁed. I conclude that facts about ‘ impulsional evidence’ 
provide no reason to think that Plantinga’s views aﬀord us plausible ways to use 
long evidentialism against the SEO. 
Does the SEO assume that Christian propositions are false? 
In WCB, Plantinga says that there is no proper de jure objection that does 
not assume the falsity of theistic belief : ‘There aren’t any de jure criticisms that 
are sensible when conjoined with the truth of theistic belief ; all of them either fail 
right from the start … or else really presuppose that theism is false’ (Plantinga 
(2000), 191). Is the SEO committed to the falsity of theism or Christianity? No. I can 
demonstrate this by commenting on WCB’s overarching argument, which is as 
follows: if the main lines of Christianity are true, then God would want persons to 
have warranted beliefs with respect to Christian propositions; and, if the conse­
quent of the previous sentence is true, then very probably paradigmatic Christian 
beliefs are warranted; so, if the main lines of Christianity are true, then very 
probably paradigmatic Christian beliefs are warranted (and thus epistemically 
rational). In a structurally identical argument applied to the kind of epistemic 
justiﬁcation at issue in the SEO, the ﬁrst premise would be this: If the main lines 
of Christianity are true, then God would want persons to have epistemically justi­
ﬁed beliefs with respect to Christian propositions. 
There are reasons, even reasons internal to a popular view about Christian 
faith, for denying that ﬁrst premise. No doubt, if the Christian story is true, then 
God would want persons to have particular aﬀections toward God and others, to 
engage in particular actions or kinds of actions, and to have particular beliefs, 
including true ones about the main lines of Christianity, required to aid one in 
living a faithful Christian life. But, it does not follow that God would want persons 
to have epistemically justiﬁed beliefs with respect to Christian propositions. 
Indeed, according to a leading notion of faith as it pertains to belief, belief by 
faith goes beyond, so to speak, the evidence we have. According to this 
view, which seems to be supported by various passages in scripture, it is a sign of 
mature faith that one has conﬁdent belief about some matters even when the 
evidence is not suitably impressive. The idea is that there is something religiously 
valuable about having some beliefs that do not ﬁt with what one’s evidence 
indicates. 
In fact, there is a wide range of views about faith along this line. At one extreme 
is the radical Kierkegaardian view (‘ I believe because it is absurd’) ;24 according to 
a popular interpretation, this view makes faith out to involve believing what is 
plainly inconsistent with one’s evidence. Less radical (and, I think, more plausi­
ble) views involve the idea that faith produces belief even when one’s evidence 
with respect to the proposition believed no more indicates the truth of the 
proposition than it indicates its falsity.25 Implicit in all such views is the idea that 
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faith is valuable because it produces the kind of conﬁdence in the main lines of 
Christianity that is not so sensitive to the vicissitudes of one’s ever-changing 
evidence base; and, partly for that reason, one’s living a life of faith – which cru­
cially involves factors intimately related to one’s beliefs (e.g. one’s aﬀections, 
desires, and actions) – need not be ruined by every epistemic challenge that 
comes along. Accordingly, faith characteristically produces true beliefs that aid 
one in living a good Christian life, but it does not follow that faith characteristi­
cally produces epistemically justiﬁed belief. Such a view is thus consistent with 
the thesis that faith characteristically produces true, but epistemically unjustiﬁed, 
belief. Reﬂection on the religious plausibility of the view reveals that the SEO is 
not committed to the falsity of Christian propositions; for, even if the SEO proves 
its conclusion, it is possible that Christian propositions are true. Hence, the SEO 
is sensible when conjoined with the truth of Christian belief. 
Why the SEO is worthy of philosophical interest 
It is surely not obvious that the total evidence of sophisticated Christians 
indicates the truth of Christian propositions. Long evidentialism is consistent 
with the view that our psychologically basic perceptual beliefs, memory beliefs, 
and a priori beliefs can be, and typically are, epistemically justiﬁed. But, it does 
not follow that a psychologically basic Christian belief is epistemically justiﬁed. If 
it is, then that will be partly, but crucially on long evidentialism, in virtue of a 
person’s being in a non-inferential mental state that indicates the truth of the 
relevant Christian proposition. So, to argue that such a state of aﬀairs obtains, one 
needs to explain how a non-inferential mental state can indicate the truth of such 
a proposition. 
Although that is no easy task, another strikes me as even more diﬃcult : explain 
why some putative defeaters for Christian propositions (or for the reasons 
sophisticates have for believing such propositions) – that sophisticates are well 
aware of – are not actual defeaters. Those worth taking seriously include some 
arguments from evil, some arguments from religious (and non-religious) diver­
sity, knowledge of epistemic peers who believe propositions inconsistent with 
Christian propositions, and arguments for the conclusion that religious experi­
ences are best explained not by the putative truth-makers of Christian prop­
ositions but by non-supernatural causes. And, depending on how much rational 
strength one’s objections have against the individual putative defeaters, one might 
still need to explain why the totality of the putative defeaters do not constitute 
epistemic defeat. On the other hand, if one attempts the strategy of arguing 
that sophisticated Christians are justiﬁed in believing Christian propositions 
on the basis of justiﬁed inferences, then one has the diﬃcult task of explaining 
what sort of inferences are suﬃcient in light of knowledge of the putative 
defeaters.26 
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The so-what? objection 
If the conclusion of the SEO does not imply that Christians are blame­
worthy for their Christian beliefs, and if it is plausible to understand religious 
faith in such a way that believing against one’s evidence can be a virtue, then why 
worry about the SEO? Even if everything I have said is true, so what?27 Why should 
sophisticated Christians be concerned about having doxastic attitudes that go 
against their evidence? 
What’s bad about believing against one’s evidence? 
Although I am not myself an evidentialist objector to the rationality of 
Christian beliefs,28 I think that there are plausible evidentialist-friendly answers to 
the so-what question. For one thing, believing what one’s evidence supports at a 
time is necessary for having knowledge at that time, and knowledge is intrinsi­
cally valuable; so, by believing what one’s evidence does not support, one fails to 
have something intrinsically valuable. 
But, this is not a fully satisfactory answer to our question. One reason is that 
one can fail to have knowledge even when one believes a proposition that one’s 
total evidence massively (but not perfectly) supports.29 Another reason concerns 
the doxastic attitude of suspending judgement. I take it that any plausible view of 
epistemic rationality implies that suspending judgement can be the epistemically 
rational attitude to take toward a proposition at a time. But one fails to have 
knowledge every time one suspends judgement. Such considerations reveal a more 
important reason that it is bad to believe against one’s evidence: doing so pre­
vents one from having an epistemically rational attitude at the very time at issue. 
Epistemic rationality is an evaluative concept, which has to do with satisfaction 
of an intellectual standard at a time, a standard the satisfying of which constitutes 
epistemic value with respect to rational enquiry at that time.30 That standard just 
is having a doxastic attitude that is supported by one’s evidence. There is a simple 
but powerful argument for this. ‘Rational’ means ‘of or based on reasoning or 
reason’.31 Although there are various kinds of reason, one has an epistemic reason 
at a time only when one has an indication of the truth of a proposition at that 
time. And any indication of the truth of a proposition to a person is very plausibly 
some evidence the person has with respect to that proposition. So, epistemic 
rationality at a time is a matter of one’s evidence that a proposition is true. In 
failing to have the doxastic attitude that ﬁts one’s evidence at a time, one fails to 
gain something of epistemic value. 
Furthermore, intuitively the epistemic value of rationality is greater than the 
epistemic value of truth. It is frequently said that lucky true beliefs are not par­
ticularly valuable epistemically. Virtually everyone agrees that you are not doing 
so well epistemically in luckily believing a truth: the common view is that you’re 
doing much better epistemically by rationally believing. So, inasmuch as 
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epistemic rationality at a time is a matter of believing what one’s evidence 
supports at that time, believing against one’s evidence is a bad thing with respect 
to what is plausibly the more valuable epistemic good. 
So, believing what one’s evidence does not support exhibits a kind of intellec­
tual failure. This is because, other things being equal, it is intellectually better to 
have an epistemically rational doxastic attitude toward a proposition than an 
epistemically irrational doxastic attitude. I take it that this is true regardless of 
what plausibly explains ‘ intellectually better’.32 The upshot is that those who have 
doxastic attitudes that do not ﬁt their evidence fail, with respect to those atti­
tudes, to satisfy the standard of epistemic excellence that characterizes well-done 
rational enquiry. That is what is bad about believing without, or against one’s, 
evidence. 
There may be a special reason that believing against one’s evidence is bad for 
sophisticated Christians. St Anselm’s motto, ‘Faith Seeking Understanding’, 
speaks to an aim of importance to typical sophisticated Christians, for it is also 
the motto of the contemporary Society of Christian Philosophers. The phrase 
contains ambiguities, but surely it is often taken to express a desire to discover 
how the central Christian doctrines are consonant with the aim of rational en­
quiry. Considered in light of much contemporary work in philosophical theology, 
it is clear that ‘ faith seeking understanding’ is often taken to express more than 
merely understanding the meanings of Christian doctrines and relations among 
them: it also involves understanding how religious belief is rational. On the 
present proposal that the aim of rational enquiry involves believing in accordance 
with one’s evidence, believing against one’s evidence can be in tension with 
satisfying one’s goal of understanding one’s faith. 
Epistemic rationality and blameworthiness 
In any case, it does not follow that people who have doxastic attitudes that 
go against their evidence deserve blame for those attitudes. The most funda­
mental reason for this is that our doxastic attitudes are not under the kind of 
direct voluntary control required for us to be responsible for them.33 We may well 
have direct voluntary control over some of the actions that bear on which beliefs 
we will have – paying close attention to our evidence, enacting policies about 
virtuous evidence acquisition, and so on – but those are actions, not beliefs. One 
might deserve praise or blame for such actions, but since one’s doxastic attitudes 
are not under one’s immediate voluntary control, one does not deserve praise or 
blame for them. 
Another reason has to do with the way that one’s beliefs at a time can positively 
aﬀect one’s future actions and future beliefs. It could be a contingent fact that one 
will gain an epistemically rational (and perhaps prudentially or morally ben­
eﬁcial) belief that q in the future only if one now believes a proposition p that is 
not supported by one’s current total evidence. To extend an example by James 
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(2003, 526), suppose that you are stuck on a mountainside in a blinding blizzard, 
and you realize that you won’t survive the night by staying where you are. 
Fumbling your way along a ledge, you come to an impassable wall. You consider 
jumping, in the hope that you’ll land safely below and ﬁnd shelter, but you lack 
the nerve to jump. So, you convince yourself, by means of a pep talk, to believe 
p : I’ll land safely if I jump. However, since you have little or no indication that p is 
true (and you remember that the general region you’re in is mostly sheer), your 
total evidence doesn’t support p. Nevertheless, emboldened by your belief that p, 
you jump, landing safely ten feet below, where you ﬁnd a cave that provides 
shelter for the night. Next morning you wake up believing q : I’ve survived the 
night and have a good chance of getting oﬀ the mountain alive, on the basis of 
perception and your mountaineering knowledge. 
So, here is a case in which you have an epistemically rational belief that q, 
which you would not have had if you had not earlier believed p, which was not 
then supported by your total evidence. It seems clear that you do not deserve 
blame for believing p ; after all, had you not believed p, you would neither have 
rationally believed q nor have survived. Reﬂection on examples like this reveals 
that the kind of synchronic rationality that the SEO focuses on can have instru­
mental value (or disvalue) for various kinds of diachronic rationality, epistemic 
and otherwise.34 
I think such considerations are signiﬁcant for right thinking about the kind of 
belief that is involved in what is called religious faith. What I have said on behalf 
of long evidentialism is consistent with the possibility that Christians’ irrationally 
believing Christian propositions at some particular time will play a crucial 
causal role in their rationally believing Christian propositions at a later 
time. Perhaps this point is relevant to an aim expressed in ‘ faith seeking under­
standing’, for it is credible that some understanding comes only by way of prior 
faith.35 
Does this lessen philosophical interest in epistemic rationality at a time, which 
the SEO focuses upon? I should think not. For even if Christians’ irrational beliefs 
can have instrumental epistemic value with respect to some future beliefs, their 
having synchronic epistemically rational beliefs whenever they do so will be in 
virtue of their having evidence that, on balance, supports those propositions; 
and, this is precisely the feature that the SEO focuses on. 
Still, given my view about faith, there can be times in a sophisticate’s life in 
which two diﬀerent doxastic goods are at odds. For instance, one can have the 
religious doxastic good of believing a proposition against one’s evidence and 
thereby lack the epistemic good of believing in accord with one’s evidence, and 
vice versa. So, even if a sophisticated Christian were convinced that the SEO is 
successful, she might not be so worried about it because she thinks that she is 
often gaining a more important good. The SEO is entirely neutral about that. But, 
she might nevertheless ﬁnd troubling a question in the spirit of the SEO: what 
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reason do you have to think that you are gaining a more important good by 
believing against your evidence? 
Conclusion 
I conclude that Plantinga’s arguments on behalf of Reformed epistem­
ology do not provide good reason to think that the SEO is improper; thus, it is 
philosophically worthwhile to consider whether the most plausible, fully articu­
lated version of the SEO is a good objection to the epistemic rationality of 
Christian belief. Such considerations will require much thought about the total 
evidence sophisticated Christians have, and this will surely require much more 
work than has been done about how religious experiences can provide evidential 
support for Christian propositions.36 Perhaps, in the future, the objection will 
be shown to be as futile as the Freud & Marx objection. But, is it not a proper 
objection?37 
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Notes 
1. That is, the SEO challenges whether sophisticated Christians have epistemic justiﬁcation for believing 
Christian propositions, not whether sophisticates base their Christian beliefs on what yields epistemic 
justiﬁcation. 
2. The epistemic condition of the sophisticated contemporary religious believer is also a focal point of
 
Quinn (1985), (1993). See also Hasker (2001).
 
3. I have no precise analysis of the supports relation implied by the evidence-justiﬁcation principle, but 
the basic idea is clear enough: if one has, say, more and better evidence indicating the truth of p at time 
t than one has indicating yp, then one’s total evidence at t supports p ; and, if one has more and better 
evidence indicating yp at t than one has indicating p, then one’s total evidence supports yp at t ; and, 
if one has no more and better evidence indicating p than one has indicating yp, then one’s total 
evidence supports neither p nor yp at t. 
4. This speciﬁcation of synchronic propositional justiﬁcation is consistent with formulations of leading 
evidentialists. For instance, Richard Feldman: ‘The central idea of evidentialism can be stated in the 
following evidentialist principle about justiﬁcation: EJ. Believing p is justiﬁed for S at t iﬀ S’s evidence at 
t supports p’; (2003), 45. 
5. Why believe the evidence-justiﬁcation principle? There are no uncontroversial counter-examples, and 
one’s possessing evidence with respect to a proposition at a time seems to be the best explanation of 
one’s being justiﬁed in the epistemic way in believing that proposition at that time; moreover, as Conee 
(1992) argues, one’s possessing evidence is the best explanation of why the epistemic kind of justiﬁcation 
is closely related to the truth of what is justiﬁed. 
6. Mentalism (or ‘mind internalism’) has two main theses: (1) a supervenience thesis (S) : ‘The justiﬁcatory 
status of a person’s doxastic attitudes strongly supervenes on the person’s occurrent and dispositional 
mental states, events, and conditions’ ; and (2) a mental duplicates thesis (M): ‘If any two possible 
individuals are exactly alike mentally, then they are alike justiﬁcationally, e.g., the same beliefs are 
justiﬁed for them to the same extent’ ; Conee and Feldman (2004), 56. 
7. The term ‘ long evidence ’ (and, by extension, ‘ long evidentialism’) was coined by Steve Wykstra (on the 
spot) at the 2007 Baylor Philosophy of Religion Conference, to describe my broad and deep construal of 
evidence. 
8. Although beliefs very plausibly count among one’s internal mental states, beliefs count as supporting 
evidence only insofar as the person’s reasons for belief, on balance, indicate the truth of the 
propositions believed. It is plausible that one’s believing that p can be evidence for the proposition that 
one believes that p ; but, it does not follow, nor is it plausible, that one’s belief that p is evidence for p. 
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9. See Kretzmann (1992). Others, who have argued that Plantinga’s anti-evidentialist arguments do not
 
apply to sensible versions of evidentialism, include Alston (1985), Wykstra (1989), and Timmons (1997).
 
10. Plantinga describes warrant as follows: ‘ the property enough of which distinguishes knowledge from 
mere true belief, is a property or quantity had by a belief if and only if … that belief is produced by 
cognitive faculties or processes functioning properly in a congenial epistemic environment according 
to a design plan successfully aimed at truth’ (2000), 204. 
11. The Freud & Marx objection amounts to the claim that religious belief is irrational because ‘ religious
 
belief is not produced by cognitive faculties that are functioning properly and aimed at the truth ’
 
(Plantinga (2000), 152) but rather religious belief arises from wishful thinking in the interest of survival,
 
peace of mind, psychological well-being, and the like [Freud] or cognitive dysfunction produced by a
 
perverted social order [Marx].
 
12. Thus Plantinga concludes: ‘There isn’t a sensible de jure objection or criticism that is independent of 
the de facto question. There aren’t any de jure criticisms that are sensible when conjoined with the truth 
of theistic belief ; all of them either fail right from the start (as with the claim that it is unjustiﬁed to 
accept theistic belief) or else really presuppose that theism is false’ ; (Plantinga (2000), 191). 
13. Unfortunately, Plantinga does not oﬀer much detail about what properties these terms are supposed to 
pick out. 
14. So, take this paper as my ‘homework’ (see Plantinga (2000), 104, n. 60) defending the properness of a 
de jure objection utilizing a view in the spirit of one of the most popular current theories of justiﬁcation. 
15. For four representative publications spread over three decades, see Plantinga (1981), (1983), (1993b), 
(2000). 
16. See Conee & Feldman (2004), 61–64. See also the ‘Epistemic rationality and blameworthiness’ section of 
this paper. 
17. This view is defended by Conee (1998). 
18. Compare this to Bertrand Russell’s (2002), 88–90 view that a ‘ feeling of pastness’ plays a crucial 
epistemic role in memory knowledge. 
19. Robert Audi speaks to the general nature of this view: ‘some foundationalists tend to see experience as a 
mirror of nature. This seems to some foundationalists a good, if limited, metaphor because it suggests at 
least two important points : ﬁrst, that some experiences are produced by external states of the world, 
somewhat as light produces mirror images; and second, that (normally) the experiences in some way 
match their causes, for instance in the color and shape one senses in one’s visual ﬁeld’ ; (Audi (1993), 
133). 
20. See Long (2010), and idem ‘Mentalism vindicated (and a super-blooper problem for proper function 
justiﬁcation) ’ (unpublished), where I argue for a similar point in an objection to Michael Bergmann’s 
(2006) claim that epistemic ﬁttingness is contingent on any cognizer’s design plan for belief formation. 
21. A referee for this journal called attention to the following view: the experience of seeing a ﬂower 
triggers the operation of what Plantinga calls the sensus divinitatis, which produces an experience of 
the presence or greatness of God. On this view, the visual experience of the ﬂower causes – in those 
whose sensus divinitatis is working properly – an experience indicating the truth of a theistic 
proposition. I think this view is relevant for what we ultimately ought to think about the SEO, and I 
intend to treat the issue in a subsequent paper. For now, I’ll make two points : First, the view depends 
on the plausibility of thinking that there is a sensus divinitatis. It is unclear how one might argue for its 
existence in a non-question-begging way, especially since only a minority of people would be inclined 
to think that it exists. The problem applied to Christian propositions is harder, since an even smaller 
minority would be inclined to think that there exists what Plantinga calls ‘ the internal instigation of the 
Holy Spirit ’, which he says is the analogous process that produces Christian beliefs. Second, the 
plausibility of the view as an objection to the SEO depends on the assumption that the putative 
defeaters I discuss – in the ‘Why the SEO is worthy of philosophical interest ’ section – are not actual 
justiﬁcation defeaters. 
22. I thank Justin McBrayer and Kenny Boyce, as well a journal referee, for pushing me to rethink this view. 
23. For excellent discussions of this issue, see Conee (1998), and see Conee and Feldman (2004, 64–67). 
24. Something along this line is a central theme in Kierkegaard (1974). 
25. This view is somewhat suggested by arguments endorsed by William James (2003). 
26. Plantinga (2000) is a notable proponent of the ﬁrst strategy. However, his responses to defeaters depend 
on some arguments that are irrelevant to long evidentialism and others are not clearly relevant. So, more 
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work is needed. Richard Swinburne (2003; 2004) is a notable proponent of the second strategy. Although 
he has provided arguments suggesting what strike me as plausible ways to work toward such a project, 
much more work is required on many details. 
27. In this vein, Plantinga says: ‘Many evidentialist objectors argue that theistic belief is irrational because 
there is insuﬃcient evidence for it ; they clearly think being irrational is a bad business; but they seldom 
say what’s bad about it. Instead, they move immediately to the task of showing, as they think, that there 
is insuﬃcient evidence for belief in God. This prior question, nonetheless, remains crucial : insuﬃcient 
for what? What is supposed to be bad about believing in the absence of evidence?’ ; (2000), 86. 
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29. For an excellent discussion of this point, see Feldman (2000), 682–686. 
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(1992, 662–663) idea that it exists in virtue of our goal with respect to rational enquiry (i.e., knowing the 
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and Plantinga’s (1993a) idea that it exists in virtue of the kind of cognitive beings we are designed to be. 
31. This is the ﬁrst deﬁnition of ‘ rational’ in The Oxford English Reference Dictionary. See Pearsall & 
Trumble (1996), 1198. 
32. For candidate explanations of ‘ intellectually better ’, see note 30. 
33. Many commentators have argued for this point, including Plantinga (1993b), 24. 
34. Another reason to deny that believing against one’s evidence makes one deserving of blame concerns 
the fact that there are various kinds of rationality, including prudential rationality. One and the same 
belief could satisfy one standard without satisfying another. See Cohen (1984), 279–280; Conee (1992), 
658–659; 667–668; and Feldman (2003), 43–45. 
35. William James (2003, 524) oﬀers reasons that provide support for this view. 
36. William Alston (1991) discusses, in the last chapter, the various grounds for religious belief that I think 
are salient for providing an adequate rebuttal of the SEO. Nevertheless, it is clear to me that more work 
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